What does a Pair Key bind, and what does dual attestation prove?
A Pair Key concatenates the fiscal sponsor’s 64-hex identity hash and the project’s 64-hex identity hash into 128 hex characters. Two content-based digests help detect changes to the recorded agreement and its recorded UTC field. They do not constitute a signature, payment proof or independent timestamp, and the key does not grant access.
Why must the digest recipe be identified?
The draft’s general recipe is D1 = SHA-256(canonical UTF-8 JSON), then D2 = SHA-256(D1 hex + UTC string). That timestamp-binding recipe is used by the About Outerprise definition board, but it is not the T.A.L. agreement recipe.
In the existing T.A.L. implementation, D1 hashes canonical JSON with generated_at and digest fields removed. D2 hashes canonical JSON with generated_at retained and digest fields removed. Keys are recursively sorted; null and undefined object values are omitted by that implementation. Verification must use the correct record’s exact bytes and recipe, not interchange these methods.
What does the retained revision 2 record say?
Author-supplied revision 2 values match the retained application snapshot: sponsor prefix bd414b348011, project prefix 6b1ddf4928b3, generated UTC 2026-10-09T16:29:37.855Z. D1 is 2238bfbd049147eec1574a122ae1f1d84e4ce7fcb644f1170731849374ab6017. D2 is 78640c4e354577b7d60fcd1dde8979ab518b8b82653ecbf00e5a7e76bdc2c91d.
The snapshot’s digest recomputation and pair-key concatenation can be checked locally against application source. This establishes consistency of the retained bytes, not an independent check of the parties, execution, current live ledger state or payment.
Does the Pair Key authorize a button or portal?
No. A Pair Key is an identity locator, not a credential or permission. Server authorization must be checked for the specific protected action; it cannot be presumed from a visible button, a pair match or a public knowledge page.
This article does not exercise or certify current server permissions, expose organization credentials, or offer ledger access. A recorded UTC field remains app-recorded time unless separately supported by an independent timestamp authority.
| Record | Digest 1 | Digest 2 |
|---|---|---|
| About Outerprise board | Canonical definition JSON | D1 hex concatenated with UTC |
| T.A.L. agreement | Canonical object without generated_at or digests | Canonical object with generated_at, without digests |
| Both | SHA-256 byte consistency | Neither a signature nor independent time proof |
Sources & contextual records
- TAL Control Addendum
Separate public management self-assessment and agreement evidence index
- Outerprise Corporate Identity
Public identity record and local document check; not a portal credential
- About Outerprise — Version 1
Definition-board timestamp-binding recipe
- Surprise, Outerprise — Examination Edition
Evidence boundaries and self-attestation limitations
- OIGP v1.3.1 — State Machine and WalkthroughDOI 10.5281/zenodo.24177899
Release v1.3.1 reference implementation and synthetic walkthrough; not a live ledger inspection.
- Dual-Receipt Profile — IETF Internet-DraftWork in progress
Individual technical proposal; an Internet-Draft, not an archived record.
Source reconciliation uses retained application code and the public examination book. Author-reported events are not independently audited. Historical definitions and agreement records remain separate and unchanged.